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Abstract 
 
In this paper we claim that the well-established reduction in self-control performance 
following prior exertion of self-control (the so-called ego depletion effect) is a consequence of 
people’s adaptation to situational demands. Consistent with this claim that follows from 
cognitive control theory, we show that (1) self-control performance improves during tasks that 
are typically used as resource depletion tasks and that (2) typical depletion effects occur only 
when the nature of the response conflicts in the two subsequent tasks is different. When the 
nature of the response conflicts in the two subsequent tasks is similar, we found that exerting 
self-control improves subsequent self-control performance. Implications for the self-control 
strength model are drawn and avenues for future research are sketched. 
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The self-control strength model (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) states that exerting self-
control taxes a limited resource that is akin to energy or strength, and thus brings people in a 
state of resource depletion. This state reduces people’s capacity to exert self-control in the 
next phase. There is wide agreement that a state of depletion is undesirable (Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2004). It reduces people’s capacity to engage in activities that are highly valued, 
such as intellectual performance (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003), food intake control 
(Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), and rational decision making (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Vohs, & 
Warlop, 2006). In this paper, we challenge this grim view on the depletion state, and claim 
that depletion is a consequence of an adaptive strategy that helps people to cope with a 
demanding task. As such, we hope to gain more insight in the processes underlying self-
control depletion.  
In the past decade, tens of studies have documented the so-called depletion effect (for a 
review, see Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). These studies typically comprise two phases. In a first 
phase, half of the people face a situation that requires them to exert self-control and half do 
not. In the second phase, people are put in another situation that requires them to exert self-
control (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). The robust finding is that self-
control performance suffers in the second phase for those people who exerted self-control in 
the first phase relative to those who did not exert self-control in the first phase. Taken 
together, these studies yield an impressive set of behaviors that appear to rely on the scarce 
resource that is needed in self-control. Previous research has shown that responses such as 
thought control (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister 1998), emotional regulation (Baumeister et al., 
1998), response inhibition (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002), repeated choosing (Bruyneel et al., 
2006), intellectual performance (Schmeichel et al., 2003), food intake control (Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000), rational consumer behavior (Vohs & Faber, 2006), self-presentation Self-Control Enhancement  4 
(Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005), and suppressing stereotype-consistent behavior (Vohs 
et al., 2005) involve the scarce self-control resource.  
Although the basic finding is undisputed, the nature of the scarce mental resource has 
remained elusive. Several moderators have been proposed that shed some light on it. Martijn 
et al.’s (2003) findings that making people think that an actually depleting task is not 
depleting reverses the depletion effect, suggests that resource depletion effects partially rely 
on the belief that exertion deserves rest. Similarly, Muraven and Slessareva (2003) showed 
that depletion occurs only in circumstances of low motivation. Webb and Sheeran (2003) 
found that making well-designed plans (implementation intentions) removes the detrimental 
depletion effects. Others have proposed mediators that increase our understanding of the 
nature of the scarce mental resource. For example, Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) showed that 
subjective time perception slows down in a state of depletion, and they provided evidence that 
this distorted time experience statistically mediated the typical depletion effects.  
In this paper, we propose that depletion effects result from an individual’s attempts to 
adapt to a situation that involves a response conflict. Adapting to a certain response conflict 
increases the fit between the individual’s response set and the demands of that particular 
situation but decreases the fit between the individual’s response set and the demands of a new 
situation triggering a different response conflict. The implication of our interpretation of the 
depletion effect in terms of adaptation to a response conflict is that the typical depletion effect 
should reverse if the response conflict in both situations is similar. The contribution of this 
paper is twofold. The empirical contribution of this paper is showing that the depletion effect 
critically depends on the dissimilarity of the response conflict in phase 1 and phase 2. We 
predict that depletion effects will occur only in case response conflicts are dissimilar in the 
two consecutive phases, and will reverse in case response conflicts are similar in the two Self-Control Enhancement  5 
consecutive phases. The theoretical contribution consists of providing insight in the nature of 
depletion.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first briefly review the cognitive 
control and self-control strength theories about how people deal with response conflicts. Then 
we clarify how the cognitive control theory can explain typical depletion effects and why it 
predicts performance improvements for consecutive self-control tasks involving similar 
response conflicts. After subsequently testing the central prediction in three studies, we 
conclude the paper with drawing theoretical implications from our results and sketching some 
future research opportunities.  
 
Depletion results from adapting to response conflicts 
 
Adapting to self-control situations involves a fine-tuning of one’s response set to increase 
the fit with the situational demands (Miller & Cohen, 2001). For instance, adapting to a 
traditional Stroop task implies learning to ignore the feature that is dominant as a result of 
more extensive and consistent use (i.e., the word meaning) and focusing on the feature that is 
subdominant as a result of less extensive and consistent use (i.e., the word color). In the first 
trials, the response conflict is intense: the response that wins the race is the wrong one. As the 
individual learns to ignore the dominant but irrelevant dimension, the response conflict 
weakens and performance improves.  
Cognitive control refers to the remarkable ability of the cognitive system to perform well 
at specific tasks through adjustments in perceptual selection, response biasing, and the on-line 
maintenance of contextual information. Cognitive control theory (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001) claims that people have a system that 
monitors for response conflicts. This system induces control processes to become actively Self-Control Enhancement  6 
involved in potentially challenging situations. According to the theory, the actual attempt to 
perform a difficult task leads to the recruitment of cognitive resources through the detection 
of conflict. Conflict indicates that current levels of control are insufficient to meet task 
demands, and thus signals a demand for greater control. The detection of conflict is an 
important function of a particular area of the human frontal lobe, namely, the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC).  
Once the ACC is activated, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) guides task performance and 
increases the likelihood that the desirable response (e.g., ‘green’) instead of the dominant 
response (e.g., ‘red’) is emitted upon the appearance of the appropriate cue (e.g., the word red 
written in green). Thus, the PFC is important when top-down processing is needed, such as 
when mappings between sensory inputs, thoughts, and actions are weakly established relative 
to other existing ones. Patterns of activity in the PFC configure processing in other parts of 
the brain in accordance with current task demands. Control is adjusted on-line, in response to 
variations in performance.  
The assumption that conflict monitoring serves as a basis for the regulation of control 
enables us to explain some interesting empirical phenomena involving on-line shifts in control 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). The most studied example of task-induced 
adjustments in control is the classic Stroop conflict paradigm (Stroop, 1935). Stroop tasks 
require people to name the color in which a color word is displayed. Response times are 
greater if there is a mismatch between the word color and the word meaning (e.g., the word 
‘RED’ displayed in green) than if the two are matched (e.g., the word ‘RED’ displayed in 
red). Incongruent trials are difficult because word reading, a strongly automatic but task-
inappropriate process, interferes with color naming. A Stroop task thus involves conflict 
between processing pathways leading to correct (but otherwise weaker) and incorrect (but 
very strong) responses. One of the most fundamental aspects of cognitive control and goal-Self-Control Enhancement  7 
directed behavior in general is the ability to select this weaker, task-relevant response over the 
stronger, but task-irrelevant response (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive control theory 
claims that this ability relies on the detection of response conflict and the subsequent 
recruitment of control processes.  
Consistent with the important role of conflict is the finding that the degree of interference 
from word reading on color naming depends on the frequency of incongruent trials, with less 
interference occurring when incongruent trials are frequent (e.g., Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 
1992). The occurrence of incongruent trials leads people to selectively attend to one attribute 
and focus more effectively on the color-naming task, enhancing their ability to avoid 
interference from the word-reading response. This is because incongruent trials involve a lot 
of conflict, which triggers activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and hence in the prefrontal 
cortex (Botvinick et al., 2001).  
However, the recruitment and deactivation of cognitive control is a gradual process that is 
characterized by a degree of inertia (Botvinick et al, 2001). We claim that the inertia in the 
cognitive control system can account for depletion effects. Miller and Cohen (2001) asserted 
that the PFC must maintain the rules of a task in the face of distracters and that this rule 
activation often extends beyond the eliciting event. Botvinick et al. (2001) incorporated 
inertia in their model simulating cognitive control, and showed that a substantial degree of 
inertia between consecutive trials is necessary to reproduce behavioral data. The inertia of 
cognitive control processes allows us to claim that cognitive control theory can accommodate 
depletion effects. Performance on a task involving a response conflict will deteriorate when it 
is preceded by a task involving a different response conflict. The sustained activity in the PFC 
reduces the flexibility of the PFC for a while.  
 
The self-control strength model and the cognitive control model. Self-Control Enhancement  8 
 
Task circumstances that have been identified as involving a high demand for control 
require planning, decision-making, troubleshooting, the overcoming of a strong habitual or 
emotional response, or resisting temptation. They might also be ill-learned or contain novel 
sequences of actions, or be technically difficult (Shallice & Burgess, 1993; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). Interestingly, both the cognitive control theory (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001) 
and the self-control strength theory (e.g., Vohs and Baumeister, 2004) refer to these very task 
characteristics when theorizing about cognitive control and self-control, respectively.  
The previous sections showed that the vast number of depletion effects that have been 
reported in the literature (for an overview, see Vohs & Baumeister, 2004) concerned a 
sequence of two such tasks involving a high demand. We argue that the deterioration in self-
control performance from task 1 to task 2 that is typically observed can be accommodated by 
both the self-control strength theory and the cognitive control theory. It is well-known that 
self-control strength theory claims that exerting self-control in phase 1 consumes a scarce 
resource, through which process people’s capacity to exert self-control in phase 2 is reduced. 
The explanation according to the cognitive control model is slightly different. Exerting self-
control in phase 1 gears the PFC towards one particular response set that matches the current 
tasks demands, and thereby looses flexibility to quickly adjust to the demands of the task in 
phase 2. So in the traditional depletion paradigm, in which two different self-control tasks 
follow each other, both models can explain the observed behavior: self-control performance 
deteriorates from phase 1 to phase 2. We use the term ego depletion to refer to this well-
established phenomenon. However, when the models are exported to a new situation in which 
two subsequent self-control tasks involve similar response conflicts, they start to produce 
sharply diverging predictions. 
 Self-Control Enhancement  9 
Cognitive control predictions  
ACC activation has been associated with tasks involving various types of conflict. For 
instance, tasks calling for the overriding of relative automatic but task-inappropriate responses 
involve conflict between processing pathways leading to correct (but usually weaker) and 
incorrect (but usually strong) responses. Tasks requiring choice among multiple possible 
responses result in conflict during the period between stimulus presentation and response 
delivery because multiple incompatible response pathways are activated. Likewise, tasks that 
lead to the commission of errors are associated with conflict due to interference between the 
pathways leading to correct and incorrect responses (Botvinick et al., 2001).  
In all cases, the detection of conflict results in an adjustment of one’s behavior in response 
to one’s own performance. Difficulty in the task results in a temporarily more focused, 
conservative approach and thus an increase in task performance (Botvinick et al., 2001). This 
leads to the straightforward prediction that when two similar highly demanding tasks follow 
each other, performance will improve from the first phase to the next.  
 
Self-control strength predictions 
The self-control resource has been shown to underlie various types of behaviors, such as 
response inhibition (Baumeister et al., 1998, study 1), response exaggeration (Schmeichel, 
Demaree, Robinson, & Pu, 2006), thought suppression (Muraven et al., 1998), or repeated 
choosing (Bruyneel et al., 2006). In all cases, it has been suggested that performance on these 
tasks relies on a scarce resource. The consumption of this resource reduces people’s ability to 
exert self-control in the next phase, even at unrelated self-control tasks. This leads to the 
straightforward prediction that when two similar highly demanding tasks follow each other, 
performance will deteriorate from the first phase to the next.  
 Self-Control Enhancement  10 
The current studies 
 
The aim of the current studies is to test the predictions derived from the self-control 
strength model and the predictions derived from the cognitive control model against each 
other. In the first two studies, we investigated whether continuing to exert self-control in the 
same domain either gradually reduces performance (consistent with the self-control strength 
model) or enhances performance (consistent with the cognitive control model). To give both 
models a fair test, we used procedures that have been successfully used as depletion 
inductions, and measured the evolution of performance within that task in the first two 
studies. In the third and fourth study, we mimicked the two phase paradigm of the depletion 
literature, and tested the importance of the similarity of the response conflict in the two tasks. 
We investigated whether the similarity between the two subsequent tasks moderates the 
direction of the depletion effect. To test this we applied a response reversal task (e.g. Paus et 
al., 1993) in the second phase of Study 3. In the first phase of that study, participants engaged 
either in a control task, a similar response reversal task (high similarity condition), or a 
thought suppression task (low similarity condition).  The self-control strength model predicts 
a deterioration of response reversal performance in the two depletion conditions in 
comparison with the control condition. The cognitive control model predicts a deterioration of 
response reversal performance in the low similarity condition and an improvement of 
response reversal performance in the high similarity condition, both compared to the control 
condition. In the fourth study, we attempted to replicate the role of similarity for another type 
of task, and ruled out the possible concern that the performance improvement in the previous 
studies is driven by mere exercising effects. Specifically, we asked participants to restrict their 
urge to consume sweets in a first phase, which is assumed to be depleting (Baumeister et al, 
1998, Study 1), and afterwards invited them to partake in a taste test (in which we asked them Self-Control Enhancement  11 
to eat, similar response conflict) or a word anagram (different response conflict). The self-
control strength model predicts that self-control performance will deteriorate, independently 
of the task. The cognitive control model, in contrast, predicts that self-control performance 




In this correlational study, we investigated the evolution of performance on a task that has 
often been used to induce depletion: thought suppression (e.g. Muraven et al, 1998). We took 
care to copy previous procedures as accurately as possible to make sure that our version 
would be depleting as well. Given the success of thought suppression as a depletion inducing 
task, the self-control strength model predicts that performance at this task should deteriorate 
during the task. More specifically, this model predicts that the time lags between two 
subsequent occurrences of the inhibited thought should decrease during the task. In other 
words, the occurrences of the forbidden thought should follow each other more rapidly 
towards the end of the task. In contrast, the cognitive control model predicts that participants 
will adapt to the task requirements and thus that performance should improve during the task. 
This implies that the time lags between two subsequent occurrences of the forbidden thought 
should increase during the task. More specifically, the occurrences of the forbidden thought 
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Two hundred and three students participated in exchange for an experimental fee. Eighty-
two (40%) were men.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to engage in a thought-listing task for five minutes. They were 
instructed to write down their thoughts on a sheet of paper and to avoid thinking about a white 
bear. When thinking of a white bear, participants had to click a button that was centrally 
displayed on the computer screen before them, and immediately change their thoughts and try 
very hard not to think of a white bear again. The time that had passed since the beginning of 
the thought-listing task was registered at each mouse click. Previous studies already 
established that trying not to think of a white bear for five minutes leads to a state of depletion 
(e.g., Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). 
 
Results and discussion 
 
To test whether performance at the thought suppression task changed during the task, we 
calculated the lags between the subsequent times at which participants indicated that they had 
thought of a white bear. Each button-click was numbered from 1 (i.e., position 1) to the total 
number of clicks for that participant (i.e., position N). Then we calculated the correlation 
between the position of the click and the lag since the previous click, or since the start of the 
task in case of the first click. We can include only those 119 participants (60%) who clicked 
at least three times (producing two lags) because correlations can only be calculated with two 
observations. Of the 84 participants for whom we do not have observations, 21 did not click, 
31 clicked once, and 32 clicked twice, leaving 119 participants in the analyses. Self-Control Enhancement  13 
For the 119 participants, we found an average correlation between position and lag of r = 
0.44, which is significantly different from zero, t(118) = 7.77, p < .0001. The lags between the 
subsequent button-clicks increased with the number of clicks, suggesting that participants 
progressively improved their performance at suppressing their thoughts.  
These data show that people have progressively less trouble inhibiting the thought of a 
white bear. Note that these findings underestimate the decay because the last difference (from 
the last occurrence of the thought until the end of the task) is omitted, although this is the 
longest interval by far for most participants. Although thought suppression has been shown to 
induce depletion (e.g. Muraven et al, 2003), our findings suggest that exerting control 
improves self-control performance on the current task. Although compelling, the reduced 
occurrence of the forbidden thoughts may follow from a natural decay of activation or from 
the fact that people become progressively more bored or oblivious of the instructions, rather 
than from the fact that people get gradually better at exerting control, as we propose. Study 2 
tried to alleviate these concerns by including a control condition and using a self-control task 




In this experiment, we again investigated the evolution of self-control performance within 
one task that has been well-established as a depletion inducing task. We selected the Stroop 
task with two levels of control demand (e.g. Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). In the high 
demand condition, participants had to ignore the dominant dimension (words) and focus on 
the less dominant dimension (color) to follow experimental instructions. In addition, they had 
to reverse the application of this rule when certain conditions were met. In the low demand Self-Control Enhancement  14 
condition, participants had to focus on the dominant response dimension (words) to follow 
experimental instructions. We looked at performance in terms of response latency.  
Because the Stroop task has been shown to induce depletion in a reliable way, the self-
control strength model predicts that performance should deteriorate during the task. This 
should be the case in the high demand condition to a larger extent than in the low demand 
condition (i.e., because the former one demands more control and hence is more depleting). 
The cognitive control model, in contrast, predicts that participants will cope with the task 
demands, resulting in an increasing speed with which they give the correct response. This 
acceleration should be stronger in the high demand condition than in the low demand 





Participants were 74 students (32 men) participating in exchange for a participation fee. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were asked to engage in a variation of the Stroop task and to indicate the ink 
color of 50 color names. Words and ink colors were either matched (e.g., RED in red ink; 
Low demand condition) or mismatched (e.g., RED in yellow ink; High demand condition). In 
addition, in the High demand condition, in case a word in blue ink appeared, which was the 
case in 25% of the trials, participants were instructed to indicate the word rather than the ink 
color. Previous studies already established that this highly demanding condition leads to a 
state of depletion (e.g., Wallace & Baumeister, 2002) in comparison with the low demanding 
condition. Self-Control Enhancement  15 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Three participants who did not follow instructions were removed. A repeated measures 
analysis on the time needed to respond correctly to the trials with the level of demand (High 
vs. Low) as between-subjects factor revealed an overall significant linear decrease in response 
time from the first to the last trial: F(1,69) = 55.79, p < .0001. More interestingly, the 
decrease in the High demand condition (trend: F(1,34) = 46.9, p < .0001) was more 
pronounced (interaction: F(1,69) = 9.85, p < .003) than in the Low demand condition (trend: 
F(1,35) = 11.58, p < .002) (see Figure 1).  
These data show that performance increases (response latency decreases) during the task, 
although this type of task has been shown to be depleting (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). The 
decrease is more pronounced in the High demand condition than in the Low demand 
condition. This pattern of data is consistent with the cognitive control model, and at odds with 
the self-control strength model.  
 




In the third study, we aimed at replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2 using the 
dominant paradigm of the depletion literature. That paradigm comprises two consecutive self-
control tasks. In this study, we explored the moderating role of similarity between the two 
phases on the depletion effect. We applied three levels of similarity: high, neutral, and low. 
Two conditions of the three used in this study match a straightforward depletion paradigm. In Self-Control Enhancement  16 
one condition, participants first engage in a non-depleting task and then proceed with a 
depleting response reversal task (i.e., the Control condition). In one other condition, 
participants first engage in a depleting thought suppression task and then engage in the same 
response reversal task (i.e., the Low similarity condition). Both the cognitive control and the 
self-control strength model predict that performance at the response reversal task should be 
worse in the latter condition than in the former.  
The third condition is the most informative condition. In that condition, participants 
engage in two subsequent, similar depleting response reversal tasks (i.e., the High similarity 
condition). The self-control strength model predicts a depletion effect akin to the one in the 
thought suppression condition. That is, participants become depleted because of the response 
reversal task that they engage in in the first phase, which should reduce their capacity to 
successfully perform in the subsequent response reversal task. The cognitive control model, in 
contrast, predicts performance to improve in the second response reversal task in comparison 
with the control condition, as participants should fine-tune to the task demands of the first 





Seventy-five students (30 men) participated in exchange for course credit. One participant 
did not follow instructions and was discarded from analysis.  
 
Procedure 
In the first phase, participants engaged in a control task (i.e., Control condition), a thought 
suppression task (i.e., Low similarity condition), or a response reversal task similar to the Self-Control Enhancement  17 
response reversal task of the second phase (i.e., High similarity condition). In the second 
phase, all participants engaged in a response reversal task. 
 
Control task. Participants were asked to watch a five-minute relaxing power-point 
presentation with landscape pictures. 
 
Thought suppression task. Participants were asked to engage in the same thought-listing 
task as the one used in Study 1. Participants were asked to click a button on the screen each 
time they thought of the forbidden concept (i.e. a white bear). Time was registered at each 
mouse click. 
 
Response reversal task. Participants were asked to match a string of characters to a shape. 
The string of characters consisted of two letters out of the set of A, B, and C that were shown 
on the first screen. The shape was either a circle or a square, which was shown on the second 
screen. For instance, participants had to click the circle when they had seen the letter strings 
“AB” or “BC”, and click the square when they had seen the letter strings “AC” or “BA” on 
the previous screen. The task consisted of 20 trials of which five trials (i.e., 25% of the trials) 
required a response reversal. If a cross was shown between the two letters, participants had to 
click the non-matching shape. A similar task requiring people to consult multiple rules and 
monitor their decisions carefully has been used successfully as a depletion inducing task 
before (Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4). 
In the second phase of the study, participants in all conditions were asked to engage in a 
similar response reversal task. The matching rule used in the response reversal task came in 
two versions (i.e., there was also a version relying on character strings consisting of two 
letters out of the set of E, F, and G). Half of the participants received the ABC version and the Self-Control Enhancement  18 
other half received the EFG version of the response reversal task. Participants in the High 
similarity condition received the version that they had not engaged in before. Performance at 
the second response reversal task was our dependent variable. 
In all conditions, participants’ mood was assessed by means of the Positive Affect 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This was done to 
validate that mood states were not different depending on self-control condition, thus ruling 




Because the latency of incorrect responses would be difficult to interpret, only correct 
responses were used in all the subsequent analyses (see Bargh, Chaiken, 
Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, 1990). In order to lessen the influence of outliers, latencies 
below 300ms and above 3000ms were set at these respective boundaries (e.g. Greenwald, 
McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). We calculated interference by distracting latencies for the 
non-conflict trials from the latencies for the response reversal trials.  
Interference was significantly affected by the prior task: F(2,72) = 8.92, p < .0004. Figure 
3 shows that, consistent with the typical depletion effect, interference was high in the Low 
similarity condition (M = 2.00, SD = 0.77) compared to the Control condition (M = 1.58, SD 
= 0.73), t(70)=2.10, p < .04, and the High similarity condition (M = 1.17, SD = 0.57), 
t(70)=4.22, p < .0001. In the High similarity condition, interference was lower than in the 
Control condition t(70)=2.10, p < .04.  
 
***Insert figure 3 about here*** 
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In the High similarity condition, people engaged in the response reversal task twice (r = 
.49, p < .02). Consistent with the between subject analyses, we found that in the High 
similarity condition (n = 25), interference was lower in phase 2 (M = 1.17, SD = 0.57, see 
above) than in phase 1 (M = 1.54, SD = 0.91; F(1,24) = 5.39, p < .03).   
The effect of the similarity condition on subsequent self-control performance cannot be 
explained by mood differences. Levels of positive (Control: M = 26.6, SD = 6.7; Low 
similarity: M = 27.3, SD = 7.1; High similarity: M = 28.8, SD = 6.2; F (1,62) = 0.7, p > .5) 
and negative affect (Control: M = 14.5, SD = 4.1; Low similarity: M = 16.0, SD = 6.8; High 
similarity: M = 13.3, SD = 3.2; F (1,62) = 1.7, p = .18) did not differ between similarity 
conditions. Moreover, adjusting for positive and negative affect as covariates did not change 
the pattern of results reported above, suggesting that mood does not mediate the effect of 




The pattern of interference in the High similarity condition is consistent with the 
predictions of the cognitive control model, and at odds with the self-control strength model. 
Although the response reversal task is depleting, which is validated by the finding that 
interference was higher in the Low similarity condition than in the Control condition, it does 
not impede self-control performance in a highly similar task. At the contrary, a between-
subject and within-subject analysis showed that it enhances performance. 
One may object that the performance improvement in the High similarity condition is 
primarily driven by exercising and that this may even hide the actual depletion effect. This 
would imply that exercising would account for the large effect (d = 1.24) between the High 
similarity and Low similarity conditions. In the final study, we aimed at ruling out that Self-Control Enhancement  20 
explanation by reducing the literal similarity between both phases, while keeping the response 




In this study, we aimed at replicating the pattern of results for a different set of self-
control tasks. We also aimed at ruling out a possible explanation in terms of exercising by 
omitting the literal similarity between the two subsequent tasks, while keeping the response 
conflict similarity between the two phases intact. To obtain this, we kept the task in phase 1 
constant and manipulated response conflict similarity between the self-control tasks in both 
phases by manipulating the nature of the task in the second phase.  
In the first phase, participants were either tempted with attractive chocolates but asked not 
to eat any (e.g. Baumeister et al, 1998, Study 1), or were asked to engage in a non-demanding 
task. In the second phase, half of the participants were asked to engage in a difficult anagram 
in which we measured their persistence in seconds (Baumeister et al., 1998, study 3). Backed 
by almost a decade of consistent findings, the self-control strength model unequivocally 
predicts that persistence on the anagram task will reduce in the group that was previously 
tempted and had to exert self-control to resist their urge to take a sweet, as compared to the 
control group. The cognitive control model provides us with the same prediction. The other 
half of the participants was asked to engage in a taste test rather than to solve an anagram in 
the second phase of the study. Controlling food intake in a taste test of attractive sweets 
requires self-control (e.g. Baumeister et al, 1998, Study 1; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Vohs 
and Heatherton, 2000). It is important to stress that the response conflict that is evoked in a 
taste test (“I would like to eat, but I shouldn’t eat too much”) is highly similar to the response 
conflict in the first phase (“I would like to eat, but I can’t”). Nevertheless, any spill over from Self-Control Enhancement  21 
phase 1 to phase 2 cannot be the result of exercising or a persistence of instruction effects, 
because the task and the task instructions differ substantially across the two phases. For one 
thing, in the first phase, we ask them not to eat, whereas in the second task, eating was 
absolutely required to complete the central task in a meaningful way.  
The self-control strength model predicts that depleted participants will have more trouble 
controlling their food intake than the control group, whereas the cognitive control model 
predicts that the depleted group will perform better at the taste test. Performance reflects 





One hundred and fifty-two female students participated in exchange for a participation fee 
or for course credit. They came to the lab in groups of 4 to 8 people. We used only women 
because gender has a major impact on food regulation which is not the main concern of the 
current study (e.g. Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). 
 
Procedure 
Temptation manipulation. In the High temptation condition, participants were given a 
knowledge task on entering the laboratory. Participants were told that the manufacturer of the 
chocolate candy brand ‘Quality Street®’ was interested in consumer knowledge of the 
association between candy flavors on the one hand and wrap colors and shapes on the other 
hand. Participants were asked to associate twelve pictures of the candies (of different colors 
and shapes) with the corresponding flavor of each candy (e.g. ‘chocolate with strawberry 
cream’). In addition, a bowl filled with lots of these ‘Quality Street’ candies was present next Self-Control Enhancement  22 
to them. They were told that the candies were placed there because the pictures were not 
always very clear. They were not allowed to eat any candy during the knowledge task, but 
were told that they were free to eat as many chocolates as they desired after the knowledge 
task. In this way, participants had to exert self-control in order to resist the candies during the 
knowledge task. Before participants had the opportunity to eat the ‘Quality Street’ candy after 
the completion of the knowledge task, the second phase started. During the first phase of the 
study, participants in the No temptation condition were asked to match ten colors with ten 
concepts (e.g. ‘white’ with ‘snow and ‘green’ with ‘grass’). 
 
The self-control task in the second phase was either similar or dissimilar to the self-
control task in the first phase.  
High similarity. In the highly similar self-control task, participants engaged in a taste test 
of a relatively unhealthy product. In line with prior research, we consider restricting 
consumption in taste tests of unhealthy products as an act of self-control (e.g. Fishbach et al., 
2003; Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). Participants were given two bowls of the same 
volume, one with regular M&Ms® (400 grams), and the other with the ‘new’ crispy M&Ms 
(300 grams). They were told that they were participating in a comparative taste test of both 
types of M&Ms. The participants were allowed to eat as many of the M&Ms as they needed 
to evaluate the M&Ms on several dimensions (e.g. ‘are they crunchy?’, ‘are they hard to 
resist?’). After the taste test, the bowls were removed, and the experimenter weighed how 
many M&Ms had been consumed.  
 
Low similarity. The low similarity self-control task consisted of untangling an anagram 
(e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998). Participants received a difficult anagram on computer. They 
received 8 characters and had to form appropriate words of at least 7 letters. Only five words Self-Control Enhancement  23 
were possible and a pretest showed that the majority of the people found none. The time spent 
solving the anagram (i.e. a persistence measure) was recorded.  
 
A pretest in the same population (n = 46) showed that the temptation manipulation did not 
affect positive (No temptation; M = 29.7, SD = 6.2; High temptation; M = 29.0, SD = 6.8, 
F<1) and negative affect (No temptation; M = 12.9, SD = 3.9; High temptation; M = 13.2, SD 
= 4.1, F<1). We preferred measuring affect in a different sample to preclude participants from 
consuming the candies of the first phase during the completion of the affect measure.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
Because the distributions of time spent and quantity consumed were skewed to the right, 
both variables were log-transformed. Both dependent measures were standardized. For the 
sake of clarity, the quantity consumed was reversed such that higher values mean better self-
control for both self-control tasks. Figure 3 shows the interaction between Similarity and 
Temptation: F(1,149) = 10.07, p < .002. The main effects were not significant (Fs < 0.1). In 
the Low similarity condition, tempted people spent less time solving anagrams, F(1,149) = 
4.98, p < .03 (tempted: M = 140s, SD = 136, not tempted: M = 189s, SD = 140). In the High 
similarity condition, tempted people performed better at the taste test by consuming less, 
F(1,149) = 5.10, p < .03 (tempted: M = 9.28g, SD = 5.9; not tempted: M = 13.12g, SD = 
7.84). 
  
*******Insert Figure 3 here******* 
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Study 4 replicates the finding of the previous studies that previous exertion of self-control 
enhances performance at a second self-control task provided that the second task is similar to 
the first task with respect to the response conflict it triggers. At first sight, these findings seem 
inconsistent with earlier findings showing that exerting self-control in a food temptation 
situation leads to increased consumption in a subsequent food consumption situation (Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000, Study 1). However, at least for non-dieters in that study, the trend was 
consistent with our findings. In the “don’t touch” condition, putting tempting food at non-




This paper compared two possible theoretical interpretations of the robust ego depletion 
effect (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). The first interpretation, which is derived from self-control 
strength theory (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), states that ego depletion reflects a reduction 
in strength, which is needed in the process of overriding one’s behavior, thoughts, or 
emotions. The second interpretation, which is derived from cognitive control theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001), states that ego depletion reflects an individual’s temporal adaptation 
to highly demanding situations. Although indistinguishable in situations where two unrelated 
self-control tasks follow each other (i.e., both models predict a reduction in self-control 
performance), the two models yield sharply divergent predictions when applied to a situation 
in which two similar self-control tasks follow each other. The self-control strength model 
predicts that exerting self-control is depleting, and hence negatively affects self-control ability 
in any subsequent situation, irrespective of the similarity between both types of demand. The 
cognitive control theory, in contrast, predicts that response conflicts lead people to temporally Self-Control Enhancement  25 
adapt to this type of situation, which should enhance their ability to deal with a subsequent 
similar response conflict.  
Our data provide strong support for the cognitive control model. In Studies 1 and 2, we 
found that performance on tasks that are typically used as a depletion manipulation improves 
with time, although we know from previous research that participants are depleted by the end 
of the task. In Study 3, we used the two phase paradigm of the depletion literature, and found 
that a depleting response reversal task enhanced self-control performance on a similar task in 
the second phase. In Study 4, we showed that a state of depletion that was caused by 
inhibiting food intake subsequently improved self-control performance in the domain of food 




The first implication of our findings is that the ego depletion effect is moderated by the 
similarity of the response conflict in the two subsequent self-control demanding situations. 
Thereby, similarity is added to the short list of boundary conditions to the ego depletion 
effect, in addition to activated beliefs (Martijn et al., 2003), the construction of 
implementation intentions (Webb and Sheeran, 2003), and high levels of motivation 
(Muraven and Slessareva, 2003). The ego depletion effect occurs only when the response 
conflict characterizing two subsequent self-control phases is sufficiently different.  
Similarity in response conflict does more than suppressing the depletion effect, however. 
Our findings also suggest that similarity reverses the depletion effect. Exerting self-control in 
a situation that involves a certain response conflict appears to facilitate self-control in a 
subsequent situation that involves a highly similar response conflict. Adapting to a response 
reversal task facilitates performance in a subsequent response reversal task (Study 3). Self-Control Enhancement  26 
Inhibiting food intake in a first phase enhances food intake control in a subsequent taste test 
(Study 4). The implication of these findings is that exerting effort is not a sufficient condition 
for the ego depletion effect (in the sense of reduced self-control capacity) to occur. People in 
the high similarity conditions of studies 3 and 4 had exerted self-control in the first phase but 
performed better in the second phase than control participants. Effort does not necessarily 
induce depletion. 
The most important implication of our data is that the self-control strength model may 
need revision. In all studies, we used tasks that have been firmly established as depleting tasks 
in the literature. Moreover, when we used the two-phase paradigm that characterizes the 
depletion literature, we replicated the depletion effect in the low similarity conditions. Still, 
the self-control strength model did not well in situations in which the response conflict in the 
two phases was similar. Although suppressing thoughts and inhibiting responses is depleting, 
we found that performance improved during the task (Study 1&2). Although people had 
exerted effort and were depleted (as validated by our finding that self-control performance 
deteriorated in tasks involving a different response conflict), their self-control performance 
improved when the response conflict in the two phases was similar (Studies 3 and 4). These 
findings cannot be accounted for by a muscle metaphor. Muscles get exhausted in using, 
whether or not they are used in similar or different tasks. The muscle metaphor implies that 
depletion of the mental resource that the self-control strength model refers to should not 
depend on the similarity of the subsequent situations. However, our data strongly suggest that 
it does.  
Our data also have implications for the societal scope of ego depletion effects. Baumeister 
and Heatherton (1996) documented the societal costs of self-control breakdown. The 
depletion effect was put forward as the culprit behind much of people’s misbehaviors as it 
provides an explanation for why people’s capacity to exert self-control is dramatically limited. Self-Control Enhancement  27 
The fact that depletion effects set in after a mere five minutes of thought suppression (e.g. 
Muraven & Slessareva, 2003) only boosted the perceived maliciousness of the ego depletion 
effect. However, our data suggest a very different possibility: the ego depletion effect may not 
point at an all too rapid drain of scarce mental resources, thereby impeding people from 
behaving in an appropriate way. Rather, it may be a side-effect of an adaptive process that 
helps people to deal with highly demanding situations.  
Indeed, cognitive control theory presents people’s ability to exert control as a strong asset. 
According to Botvinick et al. (2001), cognitive control has the flavor of strategic behavior. 
The shift in cognitive control allows people to predict aspects of future behavior based on 
current ACC activation. Conflict has the potential to act as an early warning system, allowing 
people to deal with problems before they actually occur. Miller and Cohen (2001) also 
observed that the conflict detection system allows people to allocate mental resources in an 
optimal way. For instance, drivers pay closer attention to the road on a dark and rainy night 
than on a bright day. Such adjustments are adaptive, in view of the well-recognized capacity 
limits on cognitive control. Such adjustments would correspond to strength of the PFC 
activity. In this way, cognitive control theory offers an example of how neurally plausible 
mechanisms can account for self-control, without recourse to a ‘homunculus’ (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). 
 
Future research opportunities 
 
One of the reasons why the ego depletion effect triggers so much research attention may 
be its intuitive appeal. People all experience episodes of weak willpower which are often 
related to tiredness (Muraven et al., 1998). However, this intuition does not necessarily match 
to the situation in the lab. Indeed, depletion of mental resources may actually exist, but Self-Control Enhancement  28 
probably sets in much later than after five minutes of thought suppression or attention 
regulation. Schellekens, Sijtsma, Vegter, and Meijman (2000) found sustained depletion 
effects (poorer performance) after a full afternoon of exerting effort in highly demanding 
tasks. Further, engaging in a Stroop task for 45 minutes has been shown to actually deplete 
blood sugar levels (Fairclough & Houston, 2004). An interesting line for future research is 
finding out when blood sugar depletion also starts impeding similar self-control tasks.   
A related interesting research question pertains to the moderating role of success at 
adapting to a particular response conflict. Whenever a response is successful, reinforcement 
signals increase the corresponding pattern of activity by strengthening connections between 
the PFC neurons that are activated by that response. Because of this strengthened pathway, 
task-relevant responses may eventually gradually become automatic. When this happens, 
conflict and hence the need for control diminishes. Activation in the ACC reduces, which is 
passed on to the PFC, triggering it to adjust the strength of its influence on processing 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Gradually, the PFC becomes irrelevant in the 
control of a certain task (e.g. riding a bike, Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
Consistent with this hypothesized process, the degree of interference from word reading 
on color naming depends on the frequency of incongruent trials, with less interference 
occurring when incongruent trials are frequent (e.g., Lindsay & Jacoby 1994; Tzelgov, Henik, 
& Berger, 1992). Inconsistent with this process, however, Paus, Petrides, Evans, and Meyers 
(1993) showed that including response reversals in the Stroop tasks required sustained 
cognitive control. Future research may search for moderating factors that clarify the 
distinction between tasks that impede complete adaptation (e.g. response reversal tasks) and 
tasks that allow for complete adaptation (e.g. riding a bike). The answer to this question has 
implications for the scope of the ego depletion phenomenon. It allows us to predict that 
depletion effects (in the sense of impaired self-control performance at unrelated tasks) may Self-Control Enhancement  29 
occur only when people are still adapting to a response conflict but not after they fully 
adapted. Specifically, engaging in a demanding task for five minutes may be more ‘depleting’ 
(in the sense that it impedes self-control performance at unrelated tasks) than engaging in it 
for half an hour.  
Putting the ego depletion effect in a cognitive control context opens up other interesting 
avenues for future research. Cognitive control reflects a compromise in the trade-off between 
flexibility and robustness. Robustness is required in the face of distractions, but flexibility is 
required in the face of novel demands. Positive affect seems to play an important role in 
determining people’s position on this trade-off. Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) found that 
positive affect increases the distractibility in tasks that require cognitive control, which 
suggests that positive affect pushes the system toward greater flexibility at the cost of reduced 
inertia. Relying on our claim that depletion effects (i.e. reduced self-control performance at 
unrelated tasks) reflect inertia in the cognitive control system, we submit the prediction that 
depletion effects will be attenuated with high levels of positive affect. In addition, we predict 
that individual differences such as perseverance or reactivity (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) will 
attenuate or strengthen depletion effects to the extent that they support inertia or flexibility.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Time needed to respond to an item as a function of item position. 
Figure 2. Interference effect on a response reversal task as a function of the similarity 
between the response conflict in phase 1 and phase 2.  
Figure 3. Self-control performance (standardized) as a function of the similarity between 
the second task (high for the Taste test and low for the Anagram) and preceding level of food 
temptation.  
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